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Flight crew can land an aircraft on the runway through various methods 
prescribed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Pilots can either visually 
descend to the runway through a visual approach or land using instrument 
references and radio or satellite equipment which are generally classified as 
Instrument Approach Procedures (IAPs). Visual approach is a type of IAP that is 
frequently used by Air Traffic Controllers to improve the efficiency of a runway by 
increasing the arrival rate of aircraft (FAA, 2019). 
While visual approaches are frequently used to increase efficiency and 
reduce controller workload, visual approaches pose a risk when considering the 
limitations of the human eye and visual awareness. Visual approaches require the 
pilots to either have the preceding aircraft in sight or the airport in sight while 
visually descending to the runway (FAA, 2019). Various visual stimuli that the 
pilots need to be aware and conscious of to execute a safe visual approach procedure 
test the limitations of visual awareness and pose risks that need to be identified and 
studied. This study analyzed the threats of the failure of visual awareness during a 
visual approach for transport category aircraft. 
 
Literature Review 
Visual Awareness 
Visual awareness has been studied very widely in the field of neuroscience, 
psychology, cognitive science, and philosophy. Visual awareness can be defined 
“as the subjective sensation of seeing something” (Wyart & Tallon-Baudry, 2008, 
p. 1). Li and Geng (2009) define visual awareness as a subjective visual experience. 
The study of visual awareness is closely linked to studying visual consciousness, 
visual stimuli, and visual attention (Li & Geng, 2009). 
The presence of visual stimuli does not translate to visual awareness by a 
human being. Li and Geng (2009) explain that under certain circumstances the 
retina of a human being might observe stimuli, however it may fail to perceive 
salient visual stimuli. This phenomenon has been studied in further detail by 
researchers. In a book titled Inattentional Blindness authored by Mack and Rock 
(1998), the authors conducted a study with 5,000 subjects from the University of 
California Berkeley and studied various aspects of perception and attention. Mack 
and Rock noted that as many as 25% of their participants failed to notice 
unexpected peripheral stimuli. 
Visual awareness is closely linked to visual attention. Visual attention can 
be defined as a "set of cognitive operations that mediate the selection of relevant 
information and the filtering out of irrelevant information from cluttered visual 
scenes” (McMains & Kastner, 2009, p. 1). The studies of visual awareness, visual 
attention, and visual consciousness led aviation human factors experts to focus on 
studying visual scanning, collision avoidance, situational awareness, and task 
saturation in more detail. Visual scanning, collision avoidance, situational 
awareness, and task saturation will be covered in more detail. 
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Visual Scanning and Collision Avoidance 
Advisory Circular AC 98-40D titled ‘Pilots’ Role in Collision Avoidance’ 
issued by the Federal Aviation Administration on 19th April 2016 explains the 
responsibility of pilots during flight in terms of visual scanning and collision 
avoidance. The circular explains that “Pilots should remain constantly alert to all 
traffic movement within their field of vision, as well as periodically scanning the 
entire visual field outside of their aircraft to ensure detection of conflicting traffic” 
(FAA, 2016a, p. 2). The advisory circular stresses the importance of see-and-avoid 
procedures to prevent collisions.  
FAA states that it takes about 12.5 seconds for a person to react to a threat 
in flight (FAA, 2016a). The circular advises pilots of techniques to improve the 
effectiveness of scanning outside the aircraft for traffic. It advises that if the pilot 
does have any specific object to focus on, the eyes will revert to relaxed 
intermediate focal distance which is about 10 to 30 feet. “This can be explained as 
“looking without actually seeing anything” (FAA, 2016a, p. 2). 
Through multiple experiments Colvin, Dodhia, and Dismukes (2005) 
identify that humans are poor at monitoring and searching for targets that rarely 
occur. In another study by Moiser, Skitka, Burdick, and Feer (1998) that studied 
automation bias in the cockpit, it was observed that 81% of reported problems by 
pilots stemmed from not effectively monitoring instruments during the cruise phase 
of flight. Colvin et al. further explain that visual scanning is a cognitive process 
rather than just a physical function of our eyes. 
The Federal Aviation Administration Safety Team published an article 
titled How to Avoid Mid-Air Collisions which identifies human factors as a major 
factor that causes collisions (FAA Safety Team). It specifically illustrates visual 
perception and limitations of visual scanning and the tendency of pilots to 
overestimate their visual abilities. 
Failure of Visual Awareness 
Several research studies in the field of psychology and cognitive 
psychology have demonstrated that people cannot retain all the details of the visual 
stimuli they are presented from one moment to the next (Simons & Rensink, 2003). 
Failure of visual awareness refers to the failure of human beings to retain or observe 
fully visible stimuli which might be caused due to a variety of reasons. 
Failure of visual awareness occurs due to attentional processing limitations 
of human beings deter them from observing observable visual stimuli. Scientists 
studying how people acquire and process visual information have observed a lapse 
of visual awareness (Varkin, Levin, & Fidler, 2004). Failure of visual awareness 
can be induced in multiple ways. Inattentional blindness, visual masking, 
attentional blink, and change blindness are few of the many phenomena related to 
the failure of visual awareness (Simons & Rensink, 2003). 
Varkin et al. (2004) studied the application of the failure of visual awareness 
in a human-computer interface and explained the application of their study in 
aviation. They explained that the failure of visual awareness of the pilot about the 
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instruments and Flight Management computer can lead to the pilot selecting 
incorrect mode settings for the airplane that can have a fatal impact. The authors 
further explain that “people are not only unaware of great amounts of visual 
information but they are also unaware of the extent to which they may be unaware 
of visual information” (Varakin et al., 2004, p. 391). 
Inattentional blindness. Humans have a wide variety of visual stimuli 
present at a point of time, but at each point, only a fraction of the available input 
can be processed (Most, 2013). Humans perceive only a fraction of all the stimuli 
as important. Selectivity is an important concept where there is a competition 
among stimuli for selection (Horstmann & Ansorge, 2016). Inattentional blindness 
is a failure of visual awareness where people fail to notice salient objects while 
looking right at them. This is caused due to the fixation of attention on a second 
object in the vicinity of the object (Most, 2013). Varakin et al. (2004, p. 392) 
explain inattentional blindness as “attention on one thing reduces the degree to 
which other, unattended things are processed.” Studies using eye-tracking devices 
have demonstrated that inattentional blindness can occur when the eye of the person 
is fixated directly on the object and the object is visible to anyone else whose 
attention is not fixated on any other object. 
Concerning the discussion earlier in this paper, to be visually aware of a 
visual stimulus, a person needs to have visual attention on the stimuli. Inattentional 
blindness is an illustration of that concept where visual attention plays a major role 
in a person being visually aware of a visual stimulus. Selectivity of processing 
information is an important aspect of attention. The selection of stimuli to which 
humans delegate attention to depending on the demands of the current goals of the 
human (Horstmann & Ansorge, 2016).  
Another factor that plays a role in inattentional blindness is the difficulty of 
the task (Most, 2013). A task that requires intensive attention is more likely to result 
in inattentional blindness. Another phenomenon called cognitive load plays a vital 
role in the extent of inattentional blindness. Cognitive load can be defined as “a 
multidimensional construct representing the effort that performing a particular task 
imposes on the actor's cognitive system” (Vrij, 2014, p. 2). Cognitive load is 
formally studied under the Cognitive Load Theory (CLT) which is based on a 
working memory that has limited capacity and time when it comes to retaining and 
processing information (Pavlo, Pass, Grabner, & van Gog, 2010). Higher cognitive 
load implies a person is exposed to higher information to process and retain that the 
capacity of the working memory, which can lead to inattentional blindness. 
Change blindness. Simons and Levin (1997, p. 1) describe change 
blindness as "the inability to detect changes to an object or scene.” Change 
blindness is the phenomenon and failure of visual awareness where people, under 
certain circumstances, are poor at detecting large changes in the visual scene 
(Simons & Levin, 1997). Change blindness highlights the role of attention in visual 
awareness and visual change detection (Becker, 2013). The visual awareness of 
human beings of their surroundings is far sparser than people believe it to be. 
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Multiple experiments have been conducted to study change blindness in 
human beings (Becker, 2013). Studies have mostly involved bringing about a rapid 
change in an observable visual stimulus separated by a brief blank screen. 
Participants have often failed to observe large changes in the visual stimuli if the 
change is unexpected. 
Visual masking. Visual masking is another failure of visual awareness 
which “refers to the reduced visibility of one stimulus, called target, due to the 
presence of another stimulus, called mask” (Ogemn & Breitmeyer, 2013). Visual 
masking is a general term and it can be classified into a broad range of masking 
effects types of target and masking stimuli. Masking by light is the most basic form 
of visual masking which has two other subtypes: masking of light by light and 
masking of pattern by light (Ogmen & Breitmeyer, 2013). Masking by light occurs 
when the masking stimulus is a uniform field of light. The presence of a uniform 
field of light as the masking stimulus can drastically reduce the visibility and clarity 
of the target stimulus. 
Enns and Lollo (2000) researched visual masking and other failures of 
visual awareness. They concluded that attention is a crucial factor in visual 
masking. They explained that "almost no masking occurs if attention can be rapidly 
focused on the target, whereas powerful masking ensues if attention directed at the 
target is delayed” (p. 1). 
Visual Approach 
A visual approach is conducted on an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight 
plan which authorizes the pilot to visually approach the runway while staying clear 
of clouds (FAA, 2019). Before accepting a visual approach clearance, the pilot must 
either have the airport in sight or the preceding identified aircraft in sight. The 
reported weather for a visual approach must be at least 1,000 feet of ceiling and 3 
Statute Miles of visibility. A visual approach does not constitute an instrument 
approach procedure and does not have a published missed approach procedure. If a 
go-around is executed, the air traffic controller will issue a new clearance for the 
missed approach. The authorization for a visual approach does not constitute a 
cancellation of an IFR flight plan (FAA, 2019). 
A visual approach may be issued if it's "operationally beneficial" as it allows 
for a reduction in "pilot/controller workload and expedites traffic by shortening 
flight paths to the airport” (FAA, 2019, p. 5-4-61) When the pilot is following the 
preceding aircraft, the responsibility of "safe approach interval" and wake 
turbulence separation is handed off to the pilot. This reduces the pilot/controller 
workload as well (FAA, 2019, p. 5-4-62). 
When the pilot has the airport in sight but not the preceding aircraft in sight, 
the separation and wake turbulence separation is the controller’s responsibility. The 
Federal Aviation Administration published an Information for Operators in 2011 
that stated the responsibilities and roles of a pilot in a visual approach. The 
document stated that the pilot must inform the controller immediately if any of the 
following occurs: the pilot is unable to follow the preceding aircraft, the pilot is 
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unable to remain clear of clouds, the pilot is unable to retain sight of the airport, or 
a climb is required (FAA, 2011). 
The Flight Safety Foundation Approach and Landing Accident Reduction 
(ALAR) Toolkit briefing 7.4 discusses visual approaches in detail. Flight Safety 
Foundation reports that 41% of the 118 fatal approach-and-landing accidents from 
1980 to 1996 involving jet aircraft with maximum takeoff weight above 12,500 
pounds took place during visual approaches (Flight Safety Foundation [FSF], 
2000a). Flight Safety Foundation warns against visual approaches at night and 
states that pilots should only conduct visual approaches at night weather is suitable 
under VFR, a published visual approach procedure is available, pattern altitude is 
defined, and the flight crew is familiar with airport obstruction and hazards. 
Some potential risks that FSF reports related to visual approaches are as 
follows: steep approaches that results in high airspeed and excessive sink rate, 
shallow approaches that can lead to Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT), various 
Ground Proximity Warning System call-outs, final approach course interception 
very close to the runway, incorrect crosswind correction on final, and excessive 
pitch movements or banking at a low altitude (FSF, 2000). 
 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the risk posed by the failure of visual 
awareness during visual approaches for transport category aircraft. Visual 
awareness is critical while conducting visual approaches and it is important to study 
the factors that can limit the capabilities of human beings to maintain visual 
awareness during visual approaches. 
This study will further explore the limitations of visual awareness with 
special emphasis on change blindness, inattentional blindness, and visual masking. 
This study explored visual approaches in aviation and conducted a detailed analysis 
of the Flight Safety Foundation Aviation Safety database to study the reported 
accidents during visual approaches for transport category aircraft. A total of 18 
accident reports were analyzed in the study. The effect of human factors related to 
visual awareness will be studied in those accidents.  
The study utilized a mixed-method approach as its research method using a 
causal analysis.  
 
Research Question 
How does the failure of visual awareness affect safety during visual 
approaches for transport category aircraft? 
 
Methodology 
The purpose of this paper was to evaluate the risk posed by the failure of 
visual awareness during visual approaches for transport category aircraft. Human 
factors play a dominant role in aviation accidents around the world. Visual 
approaches expose pilots to extremely high and critical visual stimuli that require 
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strong visual awareness for safe operations (Thompson, 2010). Aviation has a 
variety of airplanes and the technology and corresponding visual cues for every 
aircraft during the visual approach are drastically different. For accuracy and 
coherency of data, only data from transport category aircraft has been analyzed in 
this paper. 
The data analyzed in this paper is retrieved from the Flight Safety 
Foundation. The Flight Safety Foundation an Aviation Safety Network that is a 
“private, independent source of accurate and authoritative information on 
commercial accidents and safety issues” (FSF, 2016). The Aviation Network 
database reports are analyzed to study trends and common factors that have caused 
incidents and accidents for transport category aircraft from 1998-2018. 
Aviation Safety Database 
The Aviation Safety Database describes safety occurrences of commercials, 
military transport category, and commercial jetliner aircraft. The Aviation Safety 
Database is maintained under the Aviation Safety Network that is supported by 
Flight Safety Foundation. The Aviation Safety Network was founded in 1996 and 
it is described as a private and independent initiative (FSF, 2020a). The Aviation 
Safety Database claims to contain more than 20,300 incidents, accidents, and 
hijackings as of November 4, 2019 (Flight Safety Foundation, 2020b).  
The Aviation Safety Database developed by the Flight Safety Foundation 
was used for this study due to the methodology of their analysis, reputation of the 
organization, and information sourcing of the database. Flight Safety Foundation is 
a non-profit international organization that has contributed to aviation safety 
through research, advocacy, and education. Flight Safety Foundation consists of 
aviation safety experts from all around the world and its members include airlines, 
educators, and manufacturers from all over the globe. The Aviation Safety Database 
draws insights and conclusions directly from either the state accident investigative 
agency reports. The input of official investigative agencies and subject matter 
experts enriches the validity of the data and improves the depth and accuracy of the 
analysis. This paper will focus on incidents and accidents for transport category 
aircraft. Flight Safety Foundation considers commercials to be aircraft capable of 
carrying more than 12 passengers. 
Database Selection 
The Aviation Safety Network allows users to filter events based on the year 
of the incident/accident, aircraft type, geographical region/country, airlines, 
contributory cause, airport, or registration of the aircraft. Each category allows the 
user to further filter the search for the appropriate.  
Contributory Cause → Flight Crew was chosen as the classification criteria 
for the data for this study. The study required accidents that were caused due to 
human factors. The accidents identified were manually filtered to include accidents 
that occurred during visual approaches. The database was filtered to only include 
accidents that occurred during 1998-2018 and occurred during visual approaches 
and were caused due to human factors. This filtering of occurrences was carried out 
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manually by the researchers to include the most relevant occurrences that directly 
address the research questions of this study. 
These categories were chosen in correspondence to the literature review. 
This study focused on aspects of visual awareness and the above-mentioned 
categories fall perfectly under the scope of the failure of visual awareness. Data 
were filtered to only include occurrences between 1998 and 2018. This was carried 
out to account for the change in technology and procedures in the cockpit. 
Occurrences before 1998 were concluded by the researcher to be outdated for the 
scope and purpose of this study. 
Data were further filtered to only include occurrences for transport category 
aircraft. This was done to maintain the coherency of occurrences analyzed. The 
Federal Aviation Administration defines transport category aircraft as those for 
which a type certificate is issued under Part 21 in transport category and meet 
transport category airworthiness requirements. Transport category aircraft are 
“multi-engine airplanes with more than 19 seats or a maximum takeoff weight 
greater than 19,000 lbs” (FAA, 2018). 
 
Results 
Flight Safety Foundation reports for the criteria illustrated above were 
analyzed. Additionally, accident reports of the state accident investigation agency 
were analyzed as well due to the integrity and depth of the results that were 
provided in the reports. 
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Table 1 
List of Accidents that were Analyzed for this Study 
Case Aircraft Date Location Reference 
Case 1 Beechcraft 400A 17 April 
1999 
Beckley 
Airport, USA 
(NTSB [NTSB], 
2000) 
Case 2 Lockheed C-130E 
Hercules 
10 
December 
1999 
Kuwait-
Ahmed Al 
Jaber Air 
Force Base, 
Kuwait 
(FSF, 2020b) 
Case 3 Dassault Falcon 20F 13 June 
2000 
Peterborough 
Airport, ON, 
Canada 
(Transport 
Safety Board, 
2000) 
Case 4 Boeing 737-200 17 July 
2001 
Patna Airport, 
India 
(Court of 
Inquiry, 2001) 
Case 5 Tupolev Tu-
154M 
4 July 2001 Irkutsk 
Airport, 
Russia 
(FSF, 2020) 
Case 6 Swearingen SA226-
TC Metro II 
11 October 
2001 
Shamattawa 
Airport, 
Canada 
(Transport 
Safety Board, 
2001) 
Case 7 Antonov An24-RV 13 July 
2002 
Yakutsk 
Airport, 
Russia 
(FSF, 2020) 
Case 8 Beechcraft 1900C-1 14 January 
2008 
Kauai 
Island/Lihue 
Airport, USA 
(NTSB, 2009) 
Case 9 Swearingen SA227-
AC Metro III 
17 August 
2006 
Grain Valley-
East Kansas 
City Airport, 
USA 
(NTSB, 2007) 
 
Case 
10 
Boeing 737-400 7 March 
2007 
Yogyakarta-
Adisutjipto 
Airport, 
Indonesia 
(National 
Transport Safety 
Committee, 
2007) 
Case 
12 
Boeing 737-800 22 May 
2010 
Mangalore 
International 
Airport, India 
(Court of 
Inquiry, 2010) 
Case 
13 
SAAB 340B 13 June 
2013 
Marsh-
Harbour 
International 
Airport, 
Bahamas 
(Air Accident 
Investigation 
Bureau, 2015) 
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Case 
14 
Boeing 777-200ER 6 July 2013 San Francisco 
International 
Airport, USA 
(NTSB, 2014) 
Case 
15 
Airbus 321-231 26 
September 
2013 
Deauville-
Saint Gatien 
Airport, 
France 
(BEA, 2018) 
Case 
16 
Dassault Falcon 20E 3 March 
2014 
Kish Island 
Airport, Iran 
(Aircraft 
Accident 
Investigation 
Bureau, 2016) 
Case 
17 
Pilatus Britten-
Norman BN-2A-26 
Islander 
25 July 
2017 
Eteringbang 
Airport, 
Guyana 
(Air Accident 
Investigation 
Unit, 2017) 
Case 
18 
Bombardier Dash-8 12 March 
2018 
Tribhuvan 
International 
Airport, Nepal 
(Accident 
Investigation 
Commission, 
2019) 
 
A total of 18 accidents were analyzed in this study. The accidents were 
analyzed to derive quantitative and qualitative data. The purpose of the quantitative 
analysis was to classify accidents on the basis of lighting conditions, time of the 
day, and type of operations. The quantitative analysis will be followed by the 
qualitative analysis that will include a deeper analysis of the 18 accidents to derive 
trends and commonalities in the accidents. The analysis helped analyze the role of 
the failure of visual awareness in accidents during visual approaches for transport 
category aircraft.  
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Quantitative Analysis 
 
Figure 1. Classification of the accidents by the type of operations. This figure 
illustrates the classification of the accidents by the type of operations. 
 
The operations have been classified into passenger, private, cargo, and 
others. The "other" category includes training, aerial work, ambulance, and 
military. The accidents were classified on the basis of the local time at the 
destination airport or the location when the accident occurred. 
 
 
Figure 2. Classification of the accident on the basis of the local time at the 
destination airport or the location when the accident occurred. 
 
This figure illustrates the classification of the accident on the basis of the 
local time at the destination airport or the location when the accident occurred. The 
entire day has been divided into the increments of 4 hours to provide a distribution 
of the period of the day when most accidents occurred. The purpose of this analysis 
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is to derive data about the relation between the lighting conditions, fatigue, and 
level of circadian rhythm on safety during visual approaches. Local time was used 
instead of Zulu time because local time provides more relevant data for the purpose 
of the analysis. 
This data was used to classify the accidents on the basis of the lighting 
conditions during the accidents. The exact lighting conditions were derived from 
the state accident investigation reports. The lighting conditions are presented as day 
(after sunrise) and night (after sunset). Accidents such as in the case of case 15 
occurred during dusk where the entire operation was executed during the day but 
landing occurred during the night. For such accidents, the state aviation 
investigation report was consulted to analyze the exact time of the accident and the 
lighting conditions at that time. 
 
 
Figure 3. Classification of the accidents on the basis of the lighting conditions at 
the destination airport or the location of the accident at the time of the accident. 
 
The flight experience of the pilot-in-command of each accident was 
retrieved from the state accident investigation agency reports. The information 
provided by all the reports developed by different state agencies varied and not all 
the information required for the analyses could be retrieved.  
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Table 2 
Information of Flight Experience per Accident  
Total Time 
(Hours) 
Time on 
Type(model) in 
hours 
PIC Time 
in hours 
Last 90 days 
(Hours) 
Case 1 4719 107 2185 122 
Case 3 11800 9400 - 100 
Case 4 4361 1778 - 132 
Case 6 3100 1100 - - 
Case 8 3098 1480 - 110 
Case 9 1379 188 1127 178 
Case 10 12421 3703 - 241 
Case 11 3596 1186 2760 109 
Case 12 10216 2845 10216 147 
Case 13 8500 4700 - - 
Case 14 9684 33 3729 33 
Case 15 7025 6124 1347 312 
Case 17 4760 - - 320 
Case 18 5518 2824 - 191 
 
The information in Table 2 has been compiled from all the accident reports 
studied for this study.  
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Figure 4. Classification of the accidents by the total flight time of the PIC before 
the accident. The purpose of this analysis is to study the variation of the accidents 
by total flight experience of the PIC. Due to the unavailability of complete data, 
some accidents have not been included in this analysis. 
 
 
Figure 5: Classification of the accidents by the total flight time of the PIC on the 
type(model) of the aircraft flown during the accident. Due to the unavailability of 
complete data, some accidents have not been included in this analysis. 
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Figure 6. Classification of the accidents by the total flight time of the PIC in the 90 
days before the accident. Due to the unavailability of complete data, some accidents 
have not been included in this analysis. 
 
Qualitative Analysis 
The 18 accidents that were analyzed for this study were selected according 
to the criteria detailed in the methodology section of this paper. The database was 
also filtered to study accidents for which at least one contributory factor could be 
linked to the failure of visual awareness during the approach phase. This allowed 
the researchers to study a much-focused database that allowed a detailed and 
relevant analysis to satisfy the scope of the study and research question.  
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Table 3 
Causal Factors Identified in the 18 Accidents 
Case Causal Factors 
Case 1  Misjudgment of altitude and airspeed 
Case 2 Situational Awareness, spatial disorientation, and CRM 
Case 3 Somatogravic illusion, task saturation, and situational awareness 
Case 4 CRM 
Case 5 Pilot error (No relation to physiological factors noted) 
Case 6 Somatogravic illusion, task saturation, and situational awareness 
Case 7 Task saturation, situational awareness, and fatigue 
Case 8 Task saturation, fatigue, and spatial disorientation 
Case 9 Fatigue (long duty periods and irregular sleep for the pilots) 
Case 10 CRM 
Case 11 CRM and fatigue 
Case 12 Fatigue and CRM 
Case 13 CRM 
Case 14 Fatigue and task saturation 
Case 15 CRM 
Case 16 Fatigue, spatial disorientation,  
Case 17 Pilot error (No relation to physiological factors noted) 
Case 18 Disorientation, CRM, and situational awareness 
 
Table 3 was created after examining the contributory factors listed in the 
state aviation accident investigation reports. It was noted that each accident had 
more than one contributory factor.  
 
Table 4 
Frequency of Identified Causal Factors 
Contributory Factors Frequency 
Misjudgment 1 
Situational Awareness 5 
Disorientation and Illusions 6 
Fatigue 6 
Lack of CRM 7 
Task Saturation and Task Management 5 
15
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Figure 7. Classification of accidents based on identified contributory factors. 
 
Based on the analysis of the 18 accidents, the following were regarded as 
the key takeaways: 
• Lack of CRM, Fatigue, and situational awareness were analyzed to be the leading 
causes of accidents due to human errors related to visual awareness. 
• Two fatal accidents where loss of visual references on final led to somatogravic 
illusions.  
• Flying a visual approach during periods of ‘Low Circadian Levels’ was analyzed 
to pose a major risk.  
• Poor CRM practices described as a major risk by investigating agencies.  
• Lack of simulator training for visual approaches considered a factor in accidents.  
• Incomplete approach briefings a major cause of errors during visual approaches. 
• Geographical features around the airport play a role in illusions and misjudgment 
which can lead to black hole approaches. 
• Lack of visual references during the visual approach (due to geographical features 
or environmental conditions) led to disorientation and incorrect input by pilots.  
• The effect of fatigue on perceptual vision and visual attention during visual 
approaches was analyzed as a factor.  
The key take-aways have been adapted from the detailed analysis of the 
accident reports of all 18 accidents. A more detailed analysis of the factors, causes, 
and recommendations by the investigators for each case that led to the take-aways 
of this qualitative analysis is presented below: 
Loss of visual references on the final led to somatogravic illusions in two 
separate accidents. The two accidents are Case 3 (Dassault Falcon 20F, 13 June 
2000) and Case 6 (Swearingen SA226-TC Metro II, 11 October 2001). In Case 6, 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Misjudgement Situational
Awareness
Disorientation
and Illusion
Fatigue Lack of CRM Task Saturation
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
Causal Factors
Classification of Accidents Based on 
Identified Contributory Factors
16
International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 7 [2020], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol7/iss2/5
the accident occurred during the night (Transport Safety Board, 2001). The state 
agency investigation report discusses the illusions that could have played a role in 
the pilot losing situational awareness. The report quotes a previous Transport Safety 
Board of Canada report for a crash involving a Metroliner 3 in September 1989. 
The report discusses that “errors in the perception of attitude can occur when 
aircrew are exposed to force environments that differ significantly from those 
experienced during normal activity on the surface of the earth where the force of 
gravity is a stable reference and is regarded as the vertical” (Transport Safety 
Board, 2001, p. 4). The report discusses how a lack of visual reference (possible in 
Case 6 as the approach was conducted in the night) leads the pilots into depending 
on the vestibular organs for the perception of motion and position. Vestibular 
illusions occur in circumstances when the vestibular organs incorrectly sense 
motion and/or position. Somatogravic illusion is a type of vestibular illusion 
(Transport Safety Board, 2001). When the body which is positioned in a relatively 
stable field undergoes horizontal acceleration (in the case of the flight, the pilot 
moves the throttle forward), the otolith organs in the semi-circular canal of the year 
are stimulated in the same way as when the head is titled backward. The human 
being (pilot) gets a false perception of pitching up and reacts by pushing the nose 
of the airplane forward. This results in an increase in airspeed and loss of altitude 
(Transport Safety Board, 2001). The TSBC report states that somatogravic illusions 
are “particularly dangerous when it occurs on take-off or when overshooting, 
especially at night or in poor visibility” (Transport Safety Board, 2001, p. 5). The 
report also states that “the loss of visual references as the aircraft accelerated along 
the runway and past the lights of the community were ideal for the onset of 
somatogravic illusion in the pilot flying” (p. 8). The report also states the loss of 
situational awareness after the go-around as a contributory factor for the accident. 
While somatogravic illusion is a type of vestibular illusion, it is caused by 
a loss of adequate visual references for which failure of visual awareness of visual 
stimuli when the human being is presented with multiple visual stimuli can be a 
factor (FAA, 2016b). In the case of a go-around during the night, the pilots have to 
rely on a few unreliable visual references. Inadequate visual attention to the few 
visual references available will lead to losing that visual awareness or inattentional 
blindness (not observing visual references even while directly looking at them). 
In Case 3, the accident was investigated by the Transport Safety Board of 
Canada (Transport Safety Board of Canada, 2000). The report states pilots losing 
situation awareness while being subjected to somatogravic illusion. This flight was 
conducted during the night as well and the accident occurred while the pilot was 
turning to final to align with the runway during a visually flown circling approach. 
The workload and limited visual cues on the final approach at a low altitude can 
lead a pilot to develop somatogravic illusion (Transport Safety Board of Canada, 
2000). The report of the accident states that lack of a visual horizon, especially in 
the night, places a high risk for somatogravic illusion. The accident report also 
mentions “inadequate monitoring of flight instruments contributed to the loss of 
17
Misra: Visual Awareness during a Visual Approach
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2020
situational awareness” (Transport Safety Board, 2000, p. 11). The report also 
delegates the lack of crew resource management in the cockpit as a factor that leads 
to the loss of visual awareness of the surroundings. The pilots had delegated 
responsibilities for scanning instruments and the external visual references. The 
captain was primarily focused on the flight instruments and the first officer was 
responsible for altitude references. Even while the first officer warned the captain 
of the aircraft being low on the approach, mainly due to the Precision Approach 
Path Indicator (PAPI) light along the runway, the captain had an inadequate 
response which could primarily be due to loss of situational awareness. 
The analysis of the two accidents presented a lot of similarities. The loss of 
visual awareness due to either lack of visual attention of references or the lack of 
visual references themselves present a high risk of developing somatogravic 
illusion (or any other vestibular illusion) and losing situational awareness. As in 
Case 3, the lack of adequate CRM practices can contribute to losing situational 
awareness due to the loss of visual awareness of references. 
Loss of situational awareness and spatial disorientation was a major cause 
of accidents during visual approaches. The NTSB concluded that in Case 1, the 
accident was caused because the "pilot-in-command misjudged his altitude and 
airspeed" (NTSB, 1999, p. 1). AIB delegated loss of situational awareness and 
spatial disorientation to be a cause in Case 2 as well along with “lack of support 
from co-pilot and navigator” indicating poor CRM in the cockpit (FSF, 1999, p. 1). 
The Court of Inquiry that investigated Case 4 stated that several actions “indicated 
a lack of CRM” in the cockpit that led to the pilot stalling during the visual approach 
(Court of Inquiry, 2001, p. 107). The investigation for Case 7 leads to the 
conclusion that the pilots missed crucial visual cues while conducting the visual 
approach which was aggravated by the crew losing situational awareness and task 
saturation (FSF, 2020). The crew's action indicated signs of fatigue as well. In Case 
8, the pilot was conducting a visual approach while following a Boeing 737 (NTSB, 
2009). The NTSB report stated task saturation, fatigue, and spatial disorientation to 
be factors that led the pilot to miss the "few external visual references" that were 
present during the approach (NTSB, 2009, p. 1). 
The NTSB report stated that the few available visual references during the 
visual approach “increased the importance of monitoring flight instruments to 
maintain awareness of the airplane attitude and altitude” (NTSB, 2009, p. 1). Due 
to the surrounding demographic features and lighting conditions, the pilot had few 
visual references during the visual approach while also delegating attention towards 
the preceding aircraft. These tasks required “visual attention outside the cockpit” 
while also focusing visual attention inside the cockpit towards the cockpit 
instruments (p. 1). The NTSB concluded that these conditions “created shifting 
visual frames of reference, left the pilot vulnerable to common visual and vestibular 
illusions, and reduced his awareness of the airplane's attitude, altitude, and 
trajectory” (p. 1). 
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The NTSB concluded that the unstable approach in Case 9 was caused by 
fatigue due to long duty periods and irregular sleep (NTSB, 2007). The most 
comprehensive analysis of the effects of fatigue on pilot performance was described 
in the NTSB report of Case 9. The report discussed the effects of fatigue on “Timing 
disruption” and “Disruption of the Perpetual field.” The report described 
“disruption of the perceptual field” as “Concentrating attention upon movements or 
objects in the center of vision and neglecting those in the periphery” (NTSB, 2007, 
p. 8). The threats of this effect include “loss of accuracy and smoothness in control 
movements” (p. 8). The pilots had revealed that he was "tired" and had missed out 
on sleep due to a variety of reasons mentioned in the report (p. 8). The effects of 
fatigue on perceptual vision and timing disruption were studied in depth in the 
report. 
In Case 10, flight crew coordination and communication led to the ‘pilot 
flying’ maneuvering the airplane too steep on the approach (National Transport 
Safety Committee, 2007). The pilot did not pay visual attention to the indicators in 
the cockpit indicating an unstabilized approach. The pilot also ignored the auditory 
GPWS callouts indicating an unstabilized approach. The investigation also 
recommended enhanced simulator training for pilots on visual approaches and 
responses to warning such as GPWS warnings during approaches (NTSB, 2007). 
In Case 11, the NTSB concluded that the pilots exhibited a lack of CRM 
procedures and extreme fatigue due to lack of sleep in the preceding days of the 
accident due to the duration of the pilots’ duty periods (NTSB, 2011). 
In Case 12, fatigue played a major role that led to several decisions leading 
to the unstabilized approach (Court of Inquiry, 2010). The investigation report 
stated that the captain was asleep during the flight for the first 1 hour and 40 minutes 
of the 2 hours and 5 minutes of CVR records. The investigation stated that the pilot's 
sleepiness could have "possibly led to sleep inertia and impaired judgment" during 
the approach (Court of Inquiry, 2010, p. ix). The report also started the influence of 
flying during the "period of Window of Circadian Low" (WoCL) and its effects on 
the judgment and performance of the pilot (Court of Inquiry, 2010, p. 1). This led 
to the pilot not focusing visual attention on cockpit instruments during the approach 
and missing crucial visual warnings that indicated a highly unstabilized approach. 
The lack of CRM was investigated as well as the captain had ignored multiple 
concerns and go-around calls from the first officer (3 go-around calls from the first 
officer recorded in the CVR). The investigation also recommended enhanced 
simulator training for pilots to identify visual cues and warnings and responses to 
unstabilized approaches. Further, the investigation stated that the airline (Air India 
Express) operated to multiple “critical airfields” that characterized enhanced threats 
during approaches, especially visual approaches (p. 79). The investigation 
recommended the airline to develop enhanced simulator training for pilots for 
“critical airfields” (p. 79). 
For Case 13, The investigating agency AAID Bahamas concluded “lack of 
crew resource management training” to be a contributory factor for the accident 
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(Air Accident Investigation Bureau, 2015, p. 15). The pilots continued the 
unstabilized approach visually and exchanged controls multiple times below 1000 
feet AGL. The pilots were distracted by stimuli outside and inside the cockpit that 
resulted in the pilots missing various visual cues that indicated an unstabilized 
approach. The AAID Bahamas accident investigation report stated that the pilot and 
co-pilot stated at “differing times that they had the runway in sight, then they lost 
sight of it, then they had it again and then lost it again, this process repeated several 
times up to the point of touch down. It was evident from the CVR recording that 
neither pilot definitively had the runway in sight” (p. 11). An external factor that 
played a key role in the accident was the weather with a thunderstorm cell situated 
right over the airfield during the time of the approach. The report stated that “Due 
to the weather conditions, visibility of the runway was intermittent, yet the crew 
continued descending visually in an attempt to land the aircraft on a runway that 
was not in sight and not served by an instrument landing system (ILS) or other 
navigational aid used during inclement weather or periods of reduced visibility” (p. 
13). The Aeronautical Decision Making of the pilots was examined in the 
investigation as well. 
In Case 14, the investigation by the NTSB concluded that “although the ILS 
glideslope was out of service, the lack of a glideslope should not have precluded 
the pilots’ successful completion of a visual approach” (NTSB, 2014, p. 77). Due 
to multiple visual cues available to the pilots such as the PAPI and “visual aspect 
of the runway” (p.77) The NTSB report also indicated that the pilots indicated 
fatigue that resulted in the pilots being “fixated” while cross-checking the 
instruments (p. 86). The NTSB concluded that “that the flight crew was 
experiencing fatigue, which likely degraded their performance during the 
approach” (p. 86). The NTSB advocated for Fatigue Risk Management System 
(FRMS) for airlines to collect data and make changes to factors such as scheduling 
to minimize the effects of fatigue. The NTSB also evaluated the cross-checking of 
instruments by the pilot-flying and stated that the plot “did not adequately monitor 
airspeed between 500 and 200 ft” which “likely resulted from a combination of 
workload, expectancy, and a coincidence of timing” (p. 88). The NTSB also stated 
about automation and its effect on visual approaches that “likely resulted from a 
combination of workload, expectancy, and a coincidence of timing” (p. 88). 
Additionally, NTSB also states that automation reduces monitoring performance 
“decreases the likelihood that a human operator will detect signs of anomalous or 
unexpected system behavior involving the processes under automatic control” (p. 
90). The NTSB summarized that “insufficient flight crew monitoring of airspeed 
indications during the approach likely resulted from expectancy, increased 
workload, fatigue, and automation reliance” (p. 90). The NTSB recommended the 
operator to enhance simulator training for visual approaches to improve the pilot's 
response to unstabilized approaches, automation, and human-machine interaction. 
In Case 15, the investigative agency concluded the lack of CRM during the 
final approach to be a cause of the “serious incident” (BEA, 2018, p. 1). During the 
20
International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 7 [2020], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol7/iss2/5
approach, the pilots had missed vital visual cues of deviation of speed and descent 
profile and missed out on callouts as mandated by the Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs) of the airline. The aircraft was not stabilized during the 
approach and at 1, 000 feet AGL, the aircraft was 57 knots higher than the approach 
speed of the aircraft. The investigative agency concluded that fatigue due to the 
flight duty period of nearly 15 hours was a factor for the impaired judgment and 
inability of the pilots to recognize cues indicating an unstabilized visual approach. 
The investigative agency analyzed that flying over the ocean during the circling 
approach to play a factor in the pilots' developing illusions due to the lack of 
adequate visual references. The investigative agency also recommended enhanced 
simulator training to account for abnormal procedures such as rejection of landing 
at a low altitude during a visual approach. The agency also recommended the 
operator to include evidence-based training in its simulator training curriculum 
(BEA, 2018). 
For Case 16, the investigative agency concluded fatigue to be the primary 
contributor to the accident during the visual approach (Aircraft Accident 
Investigation Bureau, 2016). The "main cause of the accident" was reported to be 
the pilots being fatigued which caused an inability of the pilots "to adopt themselves 
with flight conditions and their interactions are due to spatial disorientation 
(illusion)” (p. 3). The report also observed various external factors that contributed 
to the pilot’s losing visual references during the approach. The pilots were landing 
during sunset and the landing runway (Runway 27) was in the direction of the 
setting sun while flying over featureless terrain (the sea). These factors contributed 
to developing spatial disorientation during the visual approach. 
For Case 17, the investigative agency recommended the operator to “review 
its special procedures and develop more comprehensive approach procedures” for 
the airport (Air Accident Investigation Unit, 2017, p. 28).  
In Case 18, the investigative agency concluded that disorientation and loss 
of situational awareness to be causes for the accident (Accident Investigation 
Commission, 2019). The visual approach was unstabilized with an “offset to the 
proper approach path that led to maneuvers in a very dangerous and unsafe attitude 
to align with the runway” (p. 40). The pilots have initiated the visual approach 
without the runway or preceding aircraft in sight and sighted the airport at very 
close proximity to the airport and at a low altitude. Poor CRM procedures were 
concluded to be a cause of the accident as well due to a "steep gradient” between 
the crew (p. 40). The CVR data also revealed that “PIC lacked adequate sleep the 
previous night prior to the flight" (p. 36). This could have contributed towards the 
impaired judgment and loss of situational awareness during the visual approach. 
The airport of landing (Tribhuvan International Airport, Katmandu) was also an 
airport with high terrain and a steep approach path which made the visual approach 
to the runways particularly challenging. The investigation report revealed that none 
of the pilots had even practiced a visual approach to the airport in a simulator. While 
the PIC had operated to the airport multiple times before the accident, the co-pilot 
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was flying to the airport for the first time which would have been a factor in the 
lack of CRM in the cockpit along with the "steep gradient" between the crew which 
"prevented FO in assisting and being more assertive in significant phases of flight 
like approach and landing” (p. 36). The investigation report also revealed that 
“there was a lack of clear communication between the crew members" (p. 36). The 
investigative agency recommended the operator to include the approach to the 
airport as a part of its simulator training curriculum and including a safety pilot (3rd 
pilot) for flights with high workload and high chances of task saturation, loss of 
situational awareness, and disorientation during the approach. 
 
Discussion 
The analysis of the accident investigation reports indicates that the failure 
of visual awareness poses significant risks for visual approaches in transport 
category aircraft. The literature review studied the theoretical aspects of the failure 
of visual awareness with an overview of inattentional blindness, change blindness, 
and visual masking. While the accident investigation reports did not directly cite 
any of the failure of visual awareness studied in the literature review, the reports 
did mention the role of visual acuity and awareness as factors for increasing the 
risks of disorientation or illusions and loss of situational awareness. 
A direct correlation between factors such as fatigue, poor CRM, and lack of 
approach briefings and failure of visual awareness could not be established. 
However, fatigue, poor CRM, and lack of approach briefings were analyzed to be 
factors that posed risks during visual approaches for transport category aircraft. 
While many of the findings from the qualitative analysis did corroborate 
many aspects reviewed in the literature review, the quantitative analysis did not 
corroborate any of the theoretical aspects studied in the literature review. The 
quantitative data studied helped provide a better overview and context of the 
accidents that were analyzed for this study. 
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper was to evaluate the risk posed by the failure of 
visual awareness during visual approaches for transport category aircraft. The 
research question for this study was “How does the failure of visual awareness 
affect safety during visual approaches for transport category aircraft?” 
The qualitative analysis of the accidents did significantly indicate that the 
failure of visual awareness is a significant risk for safety during visual approaches. 
It was analyzed that several other factors could contribute towards increasing the 
risk of pilots losing visual awareness and attention. Some factors that increased the 
likelihood of losing visual awareness and attention were analyzed were task 
saturation, fatigue, lack of CRM, low lighting conditions, and lack of visual 
references. 
The analysis did highlight that in an environment when pilots were 
subjected any of the factors mentioned above, pilots did miss out on visual cues 
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indicative of unstabilized approaches inside and outside the cockpit. Some of the 
visual cues the pilots were not visually attentive to inside the cockpit were the 
aircraft instruments that indicated an unstabilized approach such as vertical speed 
indicator or altimeter and other forms of visual warnings such as the Ground 
Proximity Warning Systems indications. Some of the visual cues outside the 
cockpit were the visual references outside the cockpit such as the runway 
environment and the PAPI or VASI lights on. 
The lack of CRM, fatigue, low lighting conditions, lack of visual references, 
and task saturation posed hazards beyond impairing the visual awareness for the 
pilots. The factors also led to pilots developing visual and vestibular illusions such 
as somatogravic illusions. In fact, somatogravic illusion was attributed as a factor 
in two accidents. In total, six accident investigation reports revealed some form of 
illusion or disorientation as a factor for the accident. 
An analysis of the reports revealed that task saturation during a visual 
approach was a major factor that led to pilots developing spatial disorientation or 
illusions. In conclusion, the data studied in study can be used to develop operating 
practices to mitigate the risk of the failure of visual awareness during visual 
approaches. 
Limitations 
The results and analysis of this study was just limited to the findings in the 
state aviation accident reports. No primary data was collected which restricted a 
more comprehensive analysis of the accidents. The accidents occurred that different 
countries around the world and the investigation was conducted by different 
aviation accident investigation agencies. There was a lack of uniformity in the 
reports and there were several cases where the reports lacked data that was needed 
for a more comprehensive analysis. 
 
Practical Applications and Recommendations 
The following recommendations have been formulated after studying the 
recommendations and analysis of all 18 accidents.  
• Risk management procedures to identify ‘high risk airports’ and routes that 
consider flight duty periods, physiological factors such as ‘Low Circadian Levels’ 
during operations, and geographical features near the airport that could induce 
visual illusions.  
• Enhanced simulator training and crew qualifications for conducting visual 
approaches at high risk airports. 
• Fatigue risk management to study the risk of physiological factors on visual 
approaches. 
• Enhanced crew resource management procedures during visual approaches at high 
risk airports.  
• Improved approach briefings by flight crew to identify possible hazards to visual 
awareness and illusions. 
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